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Lateral prefrontal model-based signatures are reduced in
healthy individuals with high trait impulsivity
L Deserno1,2,3, T Wilbertz1, A Reiter1,4, A Horstmann5,6, J Neumann5,6, A Villringer5,6,7,8, H-J Heinze1,3,9 and F Schlagenhauf1,2
High impulsivity is an important risk factor for addiction with evidence from endophenotype studies. In addiction, behavioral
control is shifted toward the habitual end. Habitual control can be described by retrospective updating of reward expectations in
‘model-free’ temporal-difference algorithms. Goal-directed control relies on the prospective consideration of actions and their
outcomes, which can be captured by forward-planning ‘model-based’ algorithms. So far, no studies have examined behavioral and
neural signatures of model-free and model-based control in healthy high-impulsive individuals. Fifty healthy participants were
drawn from the upper and lower ends of 452 individuals, completing the Barratt Impulsiveness Scale. All participants performed a
sequential decision-making task during functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) and underwent structural MRI. Behavioral
and fMRI data were analyzed by means of computational algorithms reﬂecting model-free and model-based control. Both groups
did not differ regarding the balance of model-free and model-based control, but high-impulsive individuals showed a subtle but
signiﬁcant accentuation of model-free control alone. Right lateral prefrontal model-based signatures were reduced in high-
impulsive individuals. Effects of smoking, drinking, general cognition or gray matter density did not account for the ﬁndings.
Irrespectively of impulsivity, gray matter density in the left dorsolateral prefrontal cortex was positively associated with model-
based control. The present study supports the idea that high levels of impulsivity are accompanied by behavioral and neural
signatures in favor of model-free behavioral control. Behavioral results in healthy high-impulsive individuals were qualitatively
different to ﬁndings in patients with the same task. The predictive relevance of these results remains an important target for future
longitudinal studies.
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INTRODUCTION
Impulsivity can be deﬁned as a tendency for premature choices
without foresight but despite adverse consequences.1,2 Impulsiv-
ity, a multifaceted construct, has been established as a vulner-
ability factor for addiction.3 Recent studies support the view of
self-reported trait impulsivity as an endophenotype for addiction
disorders:4,5 non-addicted, albeit cognitively impaired and at-risk,
ﬁrst-degree family members showed intermediate levels of trait
impulsivity when compared with addicted siblings and unrelated
controls.4,5 This endophenotype research characterized unaffected
siblings by intermediate brain alterations, most prominently by
means of structural measures of frontostriatal circuits.6 Interest-
ingly, frontostriatal structural measures were shown to correlate
with the expression of the dominant mode of behavioral
control.7,8 An important proposal linked the personality trait
impulsivity to an overreliance on habitual behavioral control.9,10
Empirical evidence for this hypothesis mainly stems from animal
models of drug addiction showing that high-impulsive rats are
predisposed for escalation of repeated drug self-administration
and early relapse after abstinence.11
Behavioral control is postulated to be parsed between compet-
ing habitual and goal-directed systems.12,13 This dual system
theory was formalized through the use of computational
models:14 habitual control can be described by ‘model-free’
temporal-difference algorithms, which retrospectively update
expectations by reward prediction errors. Dominance of model-
free control is accompanied by reduced immediate sensitivity to
outcome devaluation because new outcome experiences are
required to gradually adapt outcome expectations.15 In marked
contrast, goal-directed control relies on the prospective con-
sideration of possible actions and their potential future
outcomes.16 This can be described by ‘model-based’ algorithms,
which capture a task as a map in a forward-planning manner and
therefore model-based control enables ﬂexible behavioral adapta-
tion in dynamic environments.17 Using sequential decision-
making and computational modeling, it was demonstrated that
healthy individuals use a mixture of both control strategies,
meanwhile prefrontal cortex (PFC) and ventral striatum code
signatures of both model-free and also model-based control.18,19
Strikingly, when using the same task, a balance of behavioral
control shifted toward model-free control was reported across
several psychiatric conditions characterized by high levels of trait
impulsivity, including addiction.7,20
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Adopting such a Computational Psychiatry approach,21–23 it has
yet not been studied whether a shift toward model-free control
also extends to the vulnerability factor impulsivity. One study
could show that high-impulsive smokers showed reduced goal-
directed control in a devaluation paradigm when compared with
low-impulsive smokers.24 However, the latter study could not rule
out potential effects of smoking addiction and did not include
functional or structural brain measures. To ﬁll this gap, we utilized
sequential decision-making, as in previous studies,7,18–20 in
healthy low- and high-impulsive individuals taken from a larger
sample. Finally, 50 participants underwent task-based functional
magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) to examine neural correlates
of model-free and model-based control based on computational
modeling of the observed behavior. First, we explored whether
high-impulsive individuals show reduced model-based control
similar to patients.7,20 Dimensional approaches to psychiatry
suggest that impairments in behavioral control, as observed in
drug addiction, could lie at the end of a continuum including
healthy high-impulsive individuals.2 Therefore, it appears con-
ceivable that healthy individuals with levels of impulsivity
comparable to patients show intermediate alterations in behav-
ioral control. Second, on the neural level, we tested whether
high-impulsive individuals show elevated model-free prediction
errors or reduced model-based signatures. Such effects were
expected in ventral striatum or PFC, as these regions were
previously indicated in coding model-free prediction errors and
additional model-based signatures.18,19 Structural MRI was ana-
lyzed by means of gray matter density to assess its covariation
with the behavioral and functional imaging effects.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Participants and instruments
A total of 452 participants completed the Barratt Impulsiveness Scale
(BIS)-11, a self-reported measurement of trait impulsivity with high retest
reliability in clinical and non-clinical populations.25 Among these, 52 right-
handed individuals were selected from the upper and lower ends. Sample
size for this study was determined in accordance to previous between-
group studies with the same task.7,20 According to the literature,26 the
mean total BIS scores of each group met criteria for high and low
impulsiveness (Table 1). Both groups were matched for age and gender
and screened for axis-I psychiatric disorders using the Structured Clinical
Interview for DSM Disorders IV (SCID-IV) interview.27 On the basis of this
screening, one participant was excluded because of a recent episode of
major depression and another participant fell asleep during task-based
fMRI. The ﬁnal sample consisted of 50 participants (24 high-impulsive and
26 low-impulsive participants). Intelligence was examined based on a
German vocabulary test28 as well as working memory using the backward
digit span test and processing speed using the digit symbol substitution
test.29 Drinking was assessed with the time-line follow-back interview.30
For detailed group description see Table 1. The local ethics committee
(University Leipzig) approved the study. All participants gave written
informed consent and received monetary compensation on an hourly basis
in addition to their monetary gain during the task. We have not replicated
the effects of impulsivity on behavioral and neural signatures in our
laboratory.
Sequential decision-making task
A two-step sequential decision-making task was implemented as in
previous studies.7,18,31 Participants had to make two sequential choices
between pairs of stimuli to receive a monetary reward after the second
choice. Within each trial, participants had to decide between two gray
boxes at the ﬁrst stage or two colored boxes at the second stage
(Figure 1a). Crucially, each ﬁrst-stage choice was associated with a different
pair of colored boxes at the second stage via a ﬁxed transition probability
of 70%, which did not change during the experiment (Figure 1b). Thus,
choice of each ﬁrst-stage stimulus was commonly (70%) associated with a
certain second-stage pair of stimuli and this is labeled a ‘common state’. In
reverse, choice of each ﬁrst-stage stimulus rarely resulted (30%) in the
other second-stage pair of stimuli and this is labeled a ‘rare state’. Model-
free control neglects this transition probability and staying with the same
ﬁrst-stage action that lead to a reward after a second-stage choice is most
likely (a main effect of reward). In contrast, model-based control takes into
account the transition probabilities. Thus, staying at the ﬁrst-stage
decreases after having received a reward in a rare state but increases
after having received no reward in a rare state (reward × state interaction).
All stimuli were randomly assigned to the left and right positions on the
screen. At the ﬁrst stage, the chosen gray stimulus was surrounded with a
red frame, moved to the top of the screen after completion of a 2- s
decision phase and remained there for 1.5 s. Subsequently, participants
entered the second stage (a common or rare state depending on the type
of transition) and decided between two colored boxes. After a second-
stage choice, feedback (reward or no reward) was delivered according to
slowly and independently changing Gaussian random walks. These
random walks were identical to Daw et al.,18 as it was shown that less
distinct random walks for reward delivery reduce the degree of model-
based behavior.32 Slowly changing reward probabilities at the second
stage challenge the subject with ongoing learning and thus maximize the
dissociation of the two control strategies at the ﬁrst stage. Thus, non-
stationary reward probabilities at the second stage induce ongoing model-
based evaluation, whereas stationary reward probabilities would favor a
dominance of model-free control at some point in time. The task consisted
of a total of 201 trials with two choice stages within each trial. Trials were
separated by an exponentially distributed intertrial interval with a mean of
2 s. Before the experiment and similar to Daw et al., participants were
explicitly informed that the transition structure from the ﬁrst to the second
stage would remain constant throughout the task. Information was
provided about the independence of reward probabilities and their
change over time. Before MRI scanning, participants performed a 55-trial
version of the task with different stimuli and reward probabilities and were
instructed to maximize reward in the main experiment, which they
received as monetary payout after completion of the task.
First-stage stay-switch behavior was analyzed as a function of reward
(reward/no reward) and state (common/rare) in the previous trial. Each
individual’s ﬁrst-stage stay probabilities were subjected to repeated-
measures analysis of variance (ANOVA, using anovan in Matlab) with
reward and state as within-subject factors and impulsivity (high/low) as
Table 1. Sample characteristics
Healthy participants With high trait impulsivity (N= 24) With low trait impulsivity (N= 26) P-value
Age (years; 24/26) 27.29± 3.67 (22–33) 27.58± 3.74 (20–33) 0.78
Gender (24/26) 12 Female/12 male 13 Female/13 male
BIS total (24/26) 74.76± 5.07 (68–90) 50.31± 3.78 (41–58) o0.001
Smoking (24/26) 1 Smoker 1 Smoker
Drinking (g; 24/25) 23.48± 21.28 (0–74) 17.48± 14.84 (0–63) 0.26
Verbal intelligence (24/25) 109.88± 7.60 (97–129) 113.08± 5.93 (104–122) 0.11
Working memory (24/25) 8.08± 2.10 (4–12) 8.12± 1.97 (5–12) 0.82
Processing speed (24/25) 88.26± 11.29 (4–12) 82.71± 11.45 (4–12) 0.09
Abbreviation: BIS, Barratt Impulsiveness Scale. Group means with s.d.'s and range in brackets are reported; for group comparisons two-sample t-tests
were used.
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between-subject factors. A main effect of reward shows an inﬂuence of
model-free control, whereas the interaction of reward and state reveals
inﬂuences of model-based control. Previously, healthy individuals showed
a mixture of both control strategies7,18–20,31,33 expressed by a signiﬁcant
main effect of reward and a signiﬁcant interaction of reward and state. In
the following, we describe a more ﬁne-grained dissociation of the two
control strategies via computational modeling, which also provides
individual trial-by-trial signatures for the analysis of neural measurements.
All behavioral analyses were performed using Matlab 2010b (The
MathWorks, Natick, Massachusetts, USA).
Computational model
As in previous studies,7,18,19,31 we adopted a computational modeling
approach to disentangle inﬂuences of model-free and model-based
control on participant’s choice behavior. To this end, three types of
models were applied. (1) A model-free algorithm capturing only a main
effect of reward in ﬁrst-stage stay-switch behavior. This algorithm was the
temporal-difference model SARSA(λ), which learns decision values retro-
spectively after prediction errors occur.34 (2) A model-based algorithm,
which only gives an interaction of reward and state but no main effect of
reward. To this end, ﬁrst-stage values were computed prospectively by
multiplying maximum values at the second stage with explicitly instructed
transition probabilities.18 (3) A combination of both algorithms, a so-called
hybrid model that can reproduce a main effect of reward and an
interaction of reward and state.18 Values from all three models were
transformed into choice probabilities using a softmax rule with three
parameters accounting for stochasticity separately at the ﬁrst and second
stages (β1 and 2) and a repetition parameter (ρ) accounting for
perseverance of ﬁrst-stage choices.
Leaving out parameters of the softmax, the model-free algorithm SARSA
(λ) has three parameters: ﬁrst- and second-stage learning rates (α1/α2),
which describe how quickly values change with respect to ﬁrst-stage and
second-stage prediction errors; stage-skipping update λ (another learning
rate), which connects the two stages via an inﬂuence of reward prediction
errors at the second-stage on ﬁrst-stage values. Importantly, λ describes
how quickly ﬁrst-stage values change with respect to second-stage reward
prediction errors and thus accounts for the main effect of reward in ﬁrst-
stage stay behavior but not for an interaction of reward and state. Thus, a
high value of λ signiﬁes a stronger inﬂuence of reward prediction errors at
the second stage on ﬁrst-stage values. The model-based algorithm shares
one parameter with the model-free algorithm (α2) because both
algorithms converge at the second stage. In line with previous work,18,19
we also show that including the parameter λ improves the ﬁt to the data
(see Supplementary Table S1). To give an interaction of reward and state
no further parameter is required as the interaction results from multiplying
maximum values of second-stage stimuli with explicitly instructed
transition probabilities.18 The hybrid algorithm has a total of four
parameters: three parameters from SARSA(λ) and a fourth parameter (ω)
that weights the inﬂuence of model-free and model-based values and is
therefore of most interest because it represents a relative balance of the
two control strategies. Please see Supplementary Information for
equations and model ﬁtting.
Model comparison
The aim of model comparison is to identify one best-ﬁtting algorithm. In
other words, a control strategy that is most likely in groups of high- and
low-impulsive individuals. To compare the three models for their relative
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Figure 1. Task and behavioral raw data. (a) Exemplary trial sequence of the task. (b) State-transition probabilities. (c) Stay-switch behavior at
the ﬁrst stage was analyzed as a function of reward and state in the previous trial. These stay probabilities were subjected to repeated-
measures analysis of variance (ANOVA) with reward and state as within-subject factors and group as between-subject factors. This revealed a
signiﬁcant main effect of reward (F(1,48)= 75.30, Po0.001) and reward × state interaction (F(1,48)= 64.30, Po0.001); no signiﬁcant main
effect of state (F(1,48)= 1.32, P= 0.26) and no signiﬁcant state × group (F(1,48)= 0.07, P= 0.80) or reward × state ×group (F(1,48)= 0.73,
P= 0.40) interactions. There was a trend toward a signiﬁcant reward ×group interaction (F(1,48)= 3.50, P= 0.07). (d) In a one-tailed post hoc
t-test, the difference between staying after rewards and staying after non-rewards was signiﬁcantly increased in the high- compared with the
low-impulsive group (T(48)= 1.94, P= 0.04). Error bars represent s.e.
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sampling from the empirical prior distribution) to a random-effects
Bayesian model selection procedure.35 The resulting exceedance prob-
abilities show which model is most likely in a population.35 In the
Supplementary Information, we show that other measurements of relative
model ﬁt proved consistent with this approach (Supplementary Table S1)
and show that best-ﬁtting parameters reproduce the observed behavior
(Supplementary Figure S1).
Group comparison of model parameters
The predictions of the two control strategies differ at the ﬁrst stage of the
task. In accordance with raw data analysis, parameters that explain
variance in ﬁrst-stage decision values are of main interest here. In the
hybrid model, the winning model in both groups, a weighting parameter
(ω) determines to which extent overall ﬁrst-stage decision values are
inﬂuenced by model-free and model-based values. Two further param-
eters, originally from the model-free algorithm, also directly inﬂuence the
update of ﬁrst-stage values: ﬁrst-stage learning rate (α1), which determines
how quickly ﬁrst-stage values change with respect to prediction errors at
the onset of the second stage, and a stage-skipping update (λ), which
determines to what extent ﬁrst-stage values change with respect to reward
prediction errors and accounts for the main effect of reward. Finally, there
is also a second-stage learning rate (α2), which determines how quickly
second-stage values change with respect to reward prediction errors but
do not directly inﬂuence ﬁrst-stage values; we subjected all four
parameters of the hybrid model (ω, α1, α2, λ) to a one-way multivariate
ANOVA (MANOVA, using manova1 in Matlab) with the between-subject
factor impulsivity (high/low).
Magnetic resonance imaging
Functional imaging was performed using a 3-Tesla Siemens Trio scanner to
acquire gradient echo T2*-weighted echo-planar images with blood
oxygenation level-dependent contrast. Covering the whole brain, 36 slices
were acquired in oblique orientation at 20° to the anterior commisure-
posterior comissure line line in ascending order with 2.5-mm thickness,
3x3mm2 in-plane voxel resolution, 0.5-mm gap between slices, repetition
time (TR) = 2 s, echo time (TE) = 22ms and a ﬂip angle α=90°. Before
functional scanning, a ﬁeld map was collected to account for individual
homogeneity differences of the magnetic ﬁeld. T1-weighted structural
images were also acquired (TR = 1300ms, TE = 3.46ms, ﬂip = 10°, matrix =
240× 256, voxel size: 1 × 1 × 1mm and slices = 170).
Analysis of fMRI data
Two participants had to be excluded because of artifacts in ventral sections
of the brain. Thus, functional imaging results are reported for a sample of
48 participants (23 high-impulsive and 25 low-impulsive participants). fMRI
data were analyzed using SPM8 (http://www.ﬁl.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm/software/
spm8/). For preprocessing, images were corrected for delay of slice time
acquisition. Voxel-displacement maps were estimated based on ﬁeld maps.
All images were realigned to correct for motion and were also corrected for
distortion and the interaction of distortion and motion. The images were
spatially normalized into the Montreal Neurological Institute space using
the normalization parameters generated during the segmentation of each
subject’s anatomical T1 scan;36 spatial smoothing was applied with an
isotropic Gaussian kernel of 6-mm full width at half maximum.
Before statistical analysis, data were high-pass-ﬁltered with a cutoff of
128 s. An event-related analysis was applied to the images on two levels
using the general linear model approach as implemented in SPM8. As in
the original paper by Daw et al.18 the analysis focused on the two time
points within each trial when prediction errors arise: at onsets of the
second stage and at onsets of reward delivery. Prediction errors at second-
stage onsets compare values of ﬁrst- and second-stage stimuli and
therefore vary with respect to the weighting parameter (ω), which gives
the balance of the two control strategies. At the ﬁrst level, both time points
were entered into the model as one regressor, which was parametrically
modulated (1) by model-free prediction errors and (2) by the difference of
model-based and model-free prediction errors, which reﬂects the
difference between model-based and model-free values (the partial
derivative of the value function with respect to ω). Note that this
difference regressor equals zero at reward delivery because both
algorithms converge at this time point. To avoid any confound of the
neural results because of activity differences between these two time
points per se, the difference regressor was mean-centered within each
subject and the time point of reward delivery was additionally included as
a separate regressor. As in Daw et al.,18 the design also included ﬁrst-stage
onsets with two parametric modulators, the softmax probability for
choosing one of the two ﬁrst-stage probabilities as well as its partial
derivative with respect to ω; however, these onsets were not in the focus
of the present analysis. Individual (random effects) model parameters
were used to generate modeling-derived regressors. Invalid trials (no
choice within response window) were modeled separately. All regressors
were convolved with the canonical hemodynamic response function as
provided by SPM8 and its temporal derivative. The six movement
parameters from the realignment were included in the model as regressors
of no interest as well as the ﬁrst derivative of translational movement with
respect to time. An additional regressor was included censoring scan-to-
scan movement 41mm.
At the second level, contrast images of model-free prediction errors and
the difference of model-based and model-free prediction errors were taken
to a second-level random-effects model. For correction of multiple
comparisons, family-wise error (FWE) Po0.05 at the cluster level was
applied to statistical maps displayed at Po0.001 uncorrected with a
cluster extent k= 20. Previous research revealed an important role of PFC
and ventral striatum in coding signatures of both systems.18,19,37,38 Thus,
the mean parameter estimates for clusters of the ventral striatum and PFC
were extracted and then tested between groups using three repeated-
measures ANOVAs with control mode (model-free/model-based) as the
within-subject factor and impulsivity (high/low) as the between-subject
factor. Subsequently, a one-way MANOVA with the between-subject factor
impulsivity was used to assess regional speciﬁcity by comparing the
difference between both effects (model-free prediction errors and the
difference of model-based and model-free prediction errors) in all three
regions of interest.
Voxel-based morphometry
For segmentation of each subject’s anatomical T1, the uniﬁed segmenta-
tion approach was applied as implemented in SPM8.36 Subsequently, each
individual’s modulated image of gray matter density was smoothed with
an isotropic Gaussian kernel of 6-mm full width at half maximum. The
smoothed images were then subjected to a random-effects model
containing total intracranial volume as a covariate.
Using fMRI clusters named above, gray matter density was extracted for
medial and lateral PFC as well as ventral striatum and included as
covariates in between-group comparisons of behavioral and functional
imaging data. We also tested for between-group effects. Independent of
impulsivity, we examined a covariation of the parameter ω with gray
matter density as reported previously for medial prefrontal and
orbitofrontal cortex.7 Given these results7 but also studies that implicate
lateral PFC in model-based control,33 we constructed a bilateral search
volume (taken from the AAL Atlas39) of medial prefrontal and orbitofrontal
cortex (superior medial frontal gyrus, medial orbitofrontal gyrus and




As BIS was the selection criterion, groups differed signiﬁcantly
(Table 1). Notably, the mean BIS of high-impulsive individuals
(74.76 ± 4.96) lays in a similar range as for drug users and their
siblings.4 As shown in Table 1, groups were matched for age and
gender and did not differ regarding measures of drinking and
smoking or neurocognitive measures.
Behavioral raw data
First-stage choice behavior of all participants showed a signiﬁcant
main effect of reward and an interaction of reward and state
(reward F(1,49) = 75.30, Po0.001, reward × state F(1,49) = 64.30,
Po0.001, Figure 1c) indicating that across all participants aspects
of model-free and model-based control were present. These
effects were also present when looking at both groups separately.
Individuals with high trait impulsivity did not show a reduction
of model-based control tested by a three-way interaction
(reward × state × impulsivity F(1,49) = 0.73, P= 0.40, Figure 1c);
however, there was a trend toward a signiﬁcant
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reward × impulsivity interaction (F(1,49) = 3.50, P= 0.07, Figure 1c).
Close inspection of Figure 1c suggest that this reward × impulsivity
interaction results from slightly lower stay probabilities in high-
impulsive compared with low-impulsive individuals after unre-
warded (particularly unrewarded-rare trials) but not rewarded
trials. Thus, the main effect of reward appeared slightly stronger in
high-impulsive individuals. To conﬁrm this, a one-tailed between-
group t-test (high4low) was performed on the main effect of
reward (the difference between staying after rewards and staying
after non-rewards). Indeed, this difference between staying after
rewards and staying after non-rewards was signiﬁcantly higher in
high-impulsive individuals (T(48) = 1.94, P= 0.04, Figure 1d), indi-
cating a subtle accentuation of model-free control in high-
impulsive individuals. Although the repeated-measures ANOVA
did not reveal any interaction of impulsivity with state or reward
and state, following a reviewer’s suggestion, we further unpacked
the reward × impulsivity interaction for rare and common trials
separately. This one-tailed post hoc test revealed that the observed
effect was mainly driven by the difference between rewarded and
unrewarded trials in rare transitions T(48) = 1.6, P= 0.06) but not in
common transitions (T(48) = 0.26, P= 0.40).
Computational modeling
Model selection revealed the hybrid model as best-ﬁtting in both
groups (high-impulsive exceedance probability = 0.9974, low-
impulsive exceedance probability = 0.9997, Supplementary Table
S1). This underlines that a mixture of both control modes,
provided by this hybrid model, is the most likely control
mechanisms in low- and high-impulsive groups.
All four parameters of the hybrid model (ω, α1, α2, λ, for their
distribution see Supplementary Table S2) were subjected to a
MANOVA with the between-subject factor impulsivity. This
revealed a signiﬁcant effect of impulsivity (ΔRoy = 0.24,
F(45) = 2.72, P= 0.041). Post hoc univariate tests (Figure 2) showed
no difference for the balance of control ω (high-impulsive
0.6076 ± 0.1114, low-impulsive 0.5943 ± 0.1080, F(1,48) = 0.19,
P= 0.64, Figure 2a), for ﬁrst-stage learning rates α1 (high-impulsive
0.5272 ± 0.2077, low-impulsive 0.4330 ± 0.1928, F(1,48) = 2.8,
P= 0.10, Figure 2b) nor for second-stage learning rates α2
(high-impulsive 0.5803 ± 0.1706, low-impulsive 0.6006 ± 0.1328,
F(1,48) = 0.22, P= 0.64, Figure 2c), but signiﬁcantly higher stage-
skipping update λ (high-impulsive 0.6854 ± 0.0756, low-impulsive
0.6202 ± 0.0965, F(1,48) = 7.00, P= 0.01, Figure 2d). In addition,
to demonstrate that the effect of impulsivity on λ was not due
to ﬁtting ω simultaneously, we also tested whether λ was
signiﬁcantly different between groups when comparing param-
eters of the model-free algorithm with ω= 0. This was indeed
the case (high-impulsive 0.69 ± 0.07, low-impulsive 0.64 ± 0.07,
T(1,48) = 2.96, P= 0.005). The parameter λ signiﬁes a stronger
inﬂuence of reward prediction errors at the second stage on
ﬁrst-stage decision values and accounts for the main effect of
reward observed in ﬁrst-stage stay behavior. In line with raw data
analysis, this speaks for a subtle, albeit signiﬁcant, elevation of
model-free control in high-impulsive individuals. This result
remained signiﬁcant when including neurocognitive measures,
amount of alcohol intake or gray matter density as covariates.
Explorative comparison of parameters of the softmax observation
model (β1, β2, ρ) and the negative log-likelihood showed no
signiﬁcant differences (T(48)⩽ 1.61, P⩾ 0.11). See Supplementary
Table S2, for distribution of all parameters and the negative
log-likelihood.
Functional MRI
As a replication of previous work,18,19 the conjunction of model-
free prediction errors and the difference of model-based and
model-free prediction errors across both groups reached
signiﬁcance (whole-brain P-FWEo0.05 at the cluster level) in
right and left ventral striatum, medial PFC and right ventrolateral
prefrontal/orbitofrontal cortex (Supplementary Table S3, Figure 3).
Thus, for between-group comparison, parameter estimates of the
clusters for the bilateral ventral striatum, medial and right
ventrolateral PFC were tested between groups using three
repeated-measures ANOVA with control (model-free/model-
based) as within-subject factor and impulsivity (high/low) as
between-subject factor. As depicted in Figure 3, no main effect of
impulsivity (F(1,46)⩽ 0.28, P⩾ 0.60) nor an impulsivity × control
interaction was observed (F(1,46)⩽ 1.79, P⩾ 0.19) in the ventral
striatum and medial PFC. In right lateral PFC, we observed no main
effect of impulsivity (F(1,46)o0.01, P= 0.99, Figure 3) but a
signiﬁcant impulsivity × learning interaction (F(1,46) = 4.80,
P= 0.03, Figure 3). To assess regional speciﬁcity, MANOVA with
the between-subject factor impulsivity was used to compare the
difference between two effects of interest (model-free prediction
errors and the difference of model-based and model-free
prediction errors) in all three regions of interest, which indeed
reached signiﬁcance (ΔRoy = 0.28, F(44) = 4.09, P= 0.01). All
between-group fMRI ﬁndings remained signiﬁcant when adding















































































































































Figure 2. Hybrid model parameters. Four parameters of the hybrid model (ω, α1, α1, λ, Supplementary Table S2) were subjected to a
multivariate analysis with the between-subject factor impulsivity. This revealed a signiﬁcant effect of impulsivity (F(45)= 2.72, P= 0.04). Post
hoc univariate tests showed no difference for (a) the balance of model-free and model-based control (ω), (b) for ﬁrst-stage learning rates (α1)
nor (c) for second-stage learning rates (α2), but (d) signiﬁcantly higher stage-skipping update (λ). Error bars represent s.e. *Signiﬁcant at
Po0.05. n.s., non-signiﬁcant.
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Structural MRI
First, no differences were observed between low- and high-
impulsive groups at a whole-brain level nor when looking at
anatomical or fMRI-derived regions of interest. Second, a
signiﬁcant positive correlation between dorsolateral prefrontal
gray matter density and parameter ω (a higher ω indicates more
model-based choices) was observed (Montreal Neurological
Institute x=− 42, y= 22, z= 50, t= 5.04, p-FWE= 0.05 for bilateral
medial and lateral PFC, r= 0.59, R2 = 0.35, 95% conﬁdence interval
(0.37, 0.75, Figure 4).
DISCUSSION
The present study shows high trait impulsivity in healthy
individuals to be accompanied by behavioral and neural
signatures in favor of a model-free system of behavioral control.
Although we did not observe a shift in the balance of behavioral
control toward model-free control in high-impulsive individuals,
two main ﬁndings support this notion: ﬁrst, in line with behavioral
raw data analysis, computational modeling revealed a subtle but
signiﬁcant accentuation of model-free control in high-impulsive
individuals; second, lateral prefrontal model-based signals were
reduced in high-impulsive individuals.
Trait impulsivity, behavioral control and addiction
High-impulsive individuals showed an accentuation of a model-
free control system, namely the impact of reward prediction errors
on ﬁrst-stage decision values was elevated. In contrast to addicted
and other psychiatric patient samples,7,20 we did not ﬁnd evidence
for an impairment of model-based behavioral control in our
sample of high-impulsive individuals. Utilizing the same sequential
decision task, it was recently demonstrated that patients with
addictive disorders and other conditions from the impulsivity–
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Figure 3. Functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) results
across the entire sample. (a) Across both groups a signiﬁcant (whole-
brain p-family-wise error (FWE)o0.05 at the cluster level) conjunction
of model-free reward prediction errors and the difference of
model-based and model-free prediction errors was observed in the
right and left ventral striatum (VS), medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC),
right ventrolateral prefrontal/orbitofrontal cortex (OFC), right and left
parietal cortex and posterior cingulate cortex. For display purposes,
maps are thresholded at Po0.001 uncorrected and a cluster extent of
k=20. (b) The mean parameter estimates of the cluster for bilateral
ventral striatum, medial and right ventrolateral PFC tested between
groups using three repeated-measures analysis. No main effect of
impulsivity (F(1,46)⩽0.28, P⩾0.60) nor an impulsivity × control
interaction was observed (F(1,46)⩽ 1.79, P⩾0.19) in the ventral
striatum and medial PFC (b, middle and lower panel). In right lateral
PFC (b, upper panel), we observed no main effect of impulsivity
(F(1,46)o0.01, P=0.99) but a signiﬁcant impulsivity × learning
interaction (F(1,46)=4.80, P=0.03). IFG, inferior frontal gyrus; lPFC,

















































Figure 4. Gray matter density and the balance of behavioral control.
(a) A positive correlation between gray matter density in the
dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (PFC; Montreal Neurological Institute
(MNI) x=− 42, y= 22, z= 50, t= 5.04, p-FWE= 0.05 for bilateral
medial and lateral PFC) and the balance of model-free and model-
based control (ω) was observed. For display purposes, maps are
thresholded at Po0.001 uncorrected and a cluster extent of k= 20.
(b) Scatterplot for illustration. FWE, family-wise error.
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model-based toward model-free control.7,20 In both patient
studies,7,20 model-based control was reduced (reward × state ×
group interaction or lower parameter ω) but patients did not
differ from controls regarding measures of the model-free system
alone (reward × group interaction or higher parameter λ). So far,
the origin of behavioral ﬁndings in patients remains unclear: they
could result from an antecedent accentuation in a model-free
system ultimately reducing model-based control, although this is
not supported by hitherto existing studies; they could be linked to
an arbitration or integration problem between two systems or
they could be tied to impairments of a model-based system alone.
Studies suggest that interindividual variability in cognitive
capacities relate to a model-based system.33,40–42 Interestingly,
Sebold et al.20 showed in alcohol-dependent patients that
reduced model-based control was at least abolished when
correcting for cognitive capacities and similar control analyses
were not reported in Voon et al.7 Here, we show that the risk
factor impulsivity results in an accentuation within a model-free
control system alone, although—unlike in addiction and other
patients groups—an overall balance of control was not altered.
Importantly, general cognition is very unlikely to account for the
ﬁndings in the present study. Nonetheless, it remains an intriguing
question why some healthy individuals perform this task in a
model-free way. One line of reasoning includes that ongoing
model-based evaluation during the main experiment challenges
limited computational resources.14 Studies in healthy individuals
support this view by showing that interindividual differences in
cognitive capacities, in particular working memory,40–42 relate to
the balance of model-free and model-based controls in this task.
Further associations were shown for acute stress reactivity and
chronic stress levels41,43 as well as striatal presynaptic dopamine
levels.19 Another idea involves that such individuals could have a
‘false’ model or a ‘false belief’ about the state transition, for
example, a subjective illusion of control. Interestingly, a recent
study reported that healthy adults with a subjective belief of
control over reward delivery, which was objectively not given,
showed increased ventral striatal and lateral prefrontal activation
during reward anticipation.44 However, this idea cannot be
adequately tested with the task applied in the present study
and instead requires experimental designs speciﬁcally tailored to
address this. Together, these factors most likely also have an
important role in explaining the emergence of a dominance of
model-free control in psychopathological groups performing this
task.7,20 With respect to addictive behaviors, it is conceivable that
longitudinal interactions with acute drug abuse,45 chronic drug
consumption46 or acute and chronic stress41,43 may ﬁnally prompt
a pattern of reduced model-based control and leave model-free
control as the only available mode of control in patients.
Reduced lateral prefrontal model-based signatures in
high-impulsive individuals
High-impulsive individuals exhibited reduced model-based signa-
tures in a sector of the lateral PFC. In previous research, measures
of impulsivity were linked to inferior parts of lateral PFC,47,48 which
is an important region exhibiting top–down control49 also during
sequential decision-making.38 Indeed, it was proposed that altered
behavioral control in addiction and impulsivity is associated or
even results from reduced prefrontal top–down control exerted
over striatal regions.1 In the present study, reduced model-based
signatures in the lateral PFC of high-impulsive individuals could
indicate such deﬁcient top–down control. In line, Daw et al.18
suggested that a covariation of ventral striatal activation with
model-free but most strikingly also model-based signatures could
result from a top–down, prefrontal to striatal, information ﬂow
between the two control systems. However, it remains an
important question what precisely determines the degree of
control exerted over striatal regions, given that ventral striatal
model-based signatures remained unaffected in high-impulsive
individuals. One potential explanation for unaffected ventral
striatal signals, and also intact model-based behavioral control,
is that medial PFC model-based signatures did not differ between
high- and low-impulsive groups. Given a likely role of medial PFC
in integrating decision values from both systems,38,50 intact
model-based coding in medial PFC may preserve neural top–down
control and thus behavioral model-based control. A failure of this
medial PFC function may ultimately result in an overall shift of
behavioral control as observed behaviorally in patients.7,20
Dopamine was also suggested to have an important role in
modulating top–down control in frontostriatal circuits.51–53 Whereas
blunted (ventral) striatal dopamine function was reported in
addicted patients both pre- and postsynaptically,54–58 animal
research has shown that Positron emission tomography (PET)
measures of ventral striatal dopamine D2 receptor availability are
lower in high-impulsive, stimulant-naive rats and predict escalated
levels of stimulant self-administration.11 Interestingly, in human
PET studies, higher levels of impulsivity were shown to be
mediated by lower levels of presynaptic dopamine function.59,60
Using the same task and analytic strategy as in the present study,
pharmacological elevation of presynaptic dopamine induced a
bias toward model-based choices.31 This positive association
between model-based control and dopamine was conﬁrmed in a
human PET-fMRI study with respect to ventral striatal presynaptic
dopamine levels.19 Interestingly, in the latter study ventral striatal
presynaptic dopamine levels were also shown to be positively
correlated with model-based signatures in lateral PFC19 at nearby
coordinates where model-based signatures were found to be
reduced in high-impulsive individuals in the present study.
Although low dopamine levels appear to be associated with
reduced model-based control, impulsivity and vulnerability to
addiction, the exact interplay of these variables still remains to be
elucidated in future translational and longitudinal studies.
One may further speculate that a lateral PFC dysfunction
characterizes the impulsive spectrum. Indeed, the observed
reduction of model-based signals in the lateral PFC nicely matches
endophenotype studies that revealed lateral PFC (in particular
inferior frontal gyrus) as a vulnerability nexus in siblings of
stimulant-dependent patients with regard to white matter
integrity and gray matter density.6 Reduced structural PFC
integrity was not observed in our sample of high-impulsive
individuals, which may be due to differences in sample charac-
teristics. In particular, high-impulsive siblings of addicted patients
also show cognitive impairments.6 To isolate effects of impulsivity,
we explicitly choose to study high-impulsive healthy individuals
who did not show differences in cognitive measures when
compared with low-impulsive individuals. Notably, all behavioral
and fMRI results associated with high impulsivity were indepen-
dent of individual variability in these cognitive measures or gray
matter density. Irrespectively of impulsivity, dorsolateral prefrontal
gray matter density was positively related to a balance of model-
free and model-based control. This conﬁrms previous ﬁndings
linking prefrontal gray matter density to a balance of control,
albeit in a different prefrontal area.7
Thus and taken together so far, it is likely that multiple ‘hits’ on
the functional and structural level multiplex to a vulnerability
pattern for addiction.61
Limitations
The presented behavioral and neural results warrant replication
and their predictive relevance remains an important target for
future longitudinal studies. Thus, future studies should follow up
healthy participants from extreme ends of personality traits, at-risk
samples and patients to examine whether alterations in behavioral
control predict future development of drug intake as suggested
by animal models.11 Regarding decision-making tasks that aim to
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assess model-free habitual and model-based goal-directed behav-
ior, construct validity remains an important issue. Work from our
group has studied construct validity by testing the applied version
of sequential decision-making and a selective devaluation task in
the same participants.62 Indeed, although in a limited sample size,
a positive correlation between the main outcome measures of
both tasks was found.62 A similar observation has recently been
conﬁrmed in a larger sample and a different design incorporating
devaluation into the sequential decision task.63 Although more
indirectly, the by now repeatedly reported association between
model-based control and general cognitive capacities40–42,64 also
supports construct validity of the applied task in terms of the
computational costs, and thus higher cognitive demands, of
model-based control.
CONCLUSION
We believe we present ﬁrst evidence for the idea that high
impulsivity in healthy individuals is accompanied by behavioral
and neural signatures in favor of model-free behavioral control.
The behavioral results in healthy high-impulsive individuals were
qualitatively different to ﬁndings in patients with the same task.
Effects of smoking, alcohol intake, general cognition or structural
brain measures did not account for the ﬁndings. Adopting a
Computational Psychiatry approach, we show that these tech-
niques represent feasible and mechanistically informative tools
that may enrich future longitudinal studies.21,65
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